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In this paper Markus Knell studies the determinants of unemployment in a two-
country-model, where real wages are the outcome of the strategic interaction 
between various institutional players (firms, unions, central banks). He shows 
that: (i) the results derived in the recent literature on this topic are not generally 
robust against the introduction of openness; (ii) the shape of the Calmfors-
Driffill curve not only depends on a country's own centralization of wage-
bargaining (CWB) but rather on home and foreign characteristics; (iii) the model 
challenges the established belief that a shift to a monetary union (MU) will 
(negatively) affect unemployment in all member countries by fundamentally 
changing the nature of strategic interactions. Under certain assumptions the 
open-economy model suggests that the formation of a MU has no effect 
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The paper studies the determinants of unemployment in a two-country-
model, where real wages are the outcome of the strategic interaction between
various institutional players (ﬁrms, unions, central banks). We show that:
(i) the results derived in the recent literature on this topic are not generally
robust against the introduction of openness; (ii) the shape of the Calmfors-
Driﬃll curve not only depends on a country’s own centralization of wage-
bargaining (CWB) but rather on home and foreign characteristics; (iii) the
model challenges the established belief that a shift to a monetary union (MU)
will (negatively) aﬀect unemployment in all member countries by fundamen-
tally changing the nature of strategic interactions. Under certain assumptions
our open-economy model suggests that the formation of a MU has no eﬀect
whatsoever on structural unemployment.
Keywords: Wage-Setting, Unemployment, Monetary Union
JEL-Classiﬁcation Numbers: E50; E58; F41; F42; J51
∗I want to thank Alex Cukierman, Steinar Holden, Martin Summer and one anonymous referee
for valuable comments. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank.1 Introduction
The labor market situation of a country is to a large part determined by the level
and ﬂexibility of real wages. In order to understand the often intricate behavior
of labor market aggregates one has thus to concentrate on the determinants of
real wages. This itself, however, is a complex ﬁeld where the level of real wages
is the outcome of at least three–strategically interdependent–processes: A wage-
formation process, where ﬁrms and unions (or employers and employees) agree on a
certain nominal wage; a price-setting mechanism, where ﬁrms choose their (relative)
prices; and ﬁnally a monetary policy decision stage, in which the general price level
is determined. All three processes thus work together to set the level of real wages
and thereby of employment.
For a long time this complex process was not analyzed in a complete fashion.
In the celebrated “LSE framework” (cf. Layard et al., 1991) the emphasis was laid
on the wage-setting and price-setting aspects, while monetary policy reactions were
almost completely ignored. In the “time inconsistency” literature on the other hand
(cf. Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoﬀ, 1985) the game
between a monetary authority and a highly stylized supply side was modelled, where
the latter mostly appeared in a quite simpliﬁed fashion without institutional details
(cf. Franzese, 2000).1
Only recently attempts have been undertaken to encompass all three sides of
this “real-wage-determining” triangle in a single framework (cf. Cukierman and
Lippi, 1999, 2001; Soskice and Iversen, 1998, 2000; Coricelli et al., 2000). This
literature has challenged common beliefs about the inﬂuence of central bank inde-
pendence (CBI) and of the centralization of wage-bargaining (CWB). First it was
shown that the celebrated results of the “time-inconsistency” literature about a neg-
ative relation between the degree of CBI and average inﬂation need not hold if one
takes the existence of non-atomistic actors (ﬁrms or unions) into account (cf. Lippi,
1999). Second it caused some doubts about the universality of the almost equally fa-
mous Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis (cf. Calmfors and Driﬃll, 1988) that the relation
between unemployment and CWB is “hump-shaped”, i.e. that the rate of unem-
ployment is lowest for very centralized and decentralized labor markets and has its
maximum at an intermediate degree of centralization. In particular it was shown
that the way monetary policy is conducted plays an important role in determining
the form and shape of this relation (cf. Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Soskice and
Iversen, 2000; Coricelli et al., 2000). Almost all of these approaches, however, look
at isolated economies and it is not clear whether the results are robust when open
economy aspects are taken into consideration.2
In this paper we study the determinants of long-run wages and unemployment in
1In addition there exists a corporatist literature which also ignores the monetary side of the
game (cf. Franzese, 2000).
2Papers that consider open economy aspects in some form or another include: Holden, 1999;
Rama, 1994; Danthine and Hunt, 1994; Coricelli et al., 2001.
7a world with two countries that are intertwined by foreign trade. The real wages in
the two countries are the outcome of the strategic interaction between three groups
of institutional players: ﬁrms (that act on imperfectly competitive goods markets),
unions (that can be more or less centralized) and central banks (that can follow a
more or less accommodating monetary policy). The microstructure of the model is
based on a framework that is frequently employed in the ﬁeld of “new open economy
macroeconomics”.3 This allows us to introduce open economy aspects in a consistent
manner, where we can take all possible spillover-eﬀects into consideration. This is
interesting for at least three reasons:
(i) It closes a gap in the recent literature on the strategic interaction between
monetary, price-setting and wage-setting institutions. In particular we can analyze
the robustness of the results that appear in this literature when a microfounded
open economy structure is introduced.
(ii) It is helpful to shed new light on various empirical regularities. We will
examine, e.g., the shape and determinants of the famous “Calmfors and Driﬃll”
curve in our model.
(iii) It oﬀers a new framework to think about the possible eﬀects of the European
Monetary Union on real wages and unemployment in the various member countries.
In particular we can discuss how countries diﬀering with respect to their size and
with respect to their wage-setting and monetary institutions will react to the loss
of own monetary and in particular of exchange rate policy.
We show that the results derived in the recent literature on strategic institutional
interaction are not generally robust with respect to the introduction of openness. In
a related closed-economy framework (Coricelli et al., 2000) it was, e.g., stated that
t h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n ti salways decreasing in the CWB. In our model, however,
this negative relation does not hold in general and we show that it is only true for
countries that are large, that have relatively uncompetitive goods markets and where
the monetary policy is rather non-accommodating. Our model thus supports the
hypothesis that the ongoing process of deregulation (increase in competitiveness)
and globalization (increase in openness) has contributed to a situation, where a
centralized wage-bargaining system is no longer advantageous.
As far as the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis is concerned we show that the shape
of the curve does not only depend on a country’s own CWB–as in the original
paper (Calmfors and Driﬃll, 1988)–but rather on home and foreign characteristics.
Empirical tests of the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis that omit the role of the wage-
bargaining and monetary policy institutions of a country’s main trading partners
can thus be regarded as “mispeciﬁed”. This neglect could then also be responsible
for their rather poor performance (cf. OECD, 1997).
Finally we investigate the likely consequences of a move towards a monetary
union. A common claim is that the shift to a monetary union will aﬀect unem-
3The model used is close to Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998). For a
general survey see Lane (2001). While those models are set in a dynamic context we work with a
basically static version.
8ployment and inﬂation in the member countries even if all structural parameters (in
particular the ones concerning CWB and CBI) stay the same. The main reason for
this prediction is that “with the formation of the monetary union all unions become
smaller relative to the monetary area [...]. This decreases their perception of the
inﬂationary repercussions of their individual wages, inducing them to more aggres-
sive wage demands” (Cukierman and Lippi, 2001, 541).4 Although the argument
sounds reasonable one has to recognize that most attempts to express it in a formal
way are based on closed-economy models (Soskice and Iversen, 1998; Cukierman
and Lippi, 2001; Grüner and Hefeker, 1999). Not only does this beg the question
why a monetary union between closed economies is formed in the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,i ta l s o
raises doubts whether and under which assumptions the argument goes through in
a framework that allows for international linkages.
Our open-economy model yields the result that the only possible impact the in-
troduction of a monetary union might have on real variables stems from eventual
changes in the monetary policy of the common central bank. If the countries forming
the monetary union were part of a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m eb e f o r ea n di ft h ec o m -
mon central bank of the monetary union is as non-accommodating as was the anchor
central bank of the ﬁxed exchange rate system then there is no eﬀect whatsoever.
The reason for this at ﬁrst sight maybe counterintuitive result is the following. Even
in the pre-monetary-union days unions and national central banks have taken for-
eign prices and foreign demand into consideration when deciding about wage-setting
and monetary policy, respectively. Unions are concerned about the competitiveness
(terms of trade) of the ﬁrms to which its’ members are attached and both unions
and national central banks care about the overall (consumption) price index that
includes prices of home-produced and foreign-produced goods. Due to the speciﬁc
assumptions of our model these “target price levels” do not change with the forma-
tion of the monetary union and neither does the perception of these eﬀects by the
main economic actors. This is not the case in the aforementioned models, where the
monetary union drives a wedge between the price level target of the common central
bank (which cares about a weighted average of national price levels) and the one of
national unions (that are only concerned about the national price levels).
All three strands of this paper thus suggest that the introduction of open-
economy issues is not a minor change (or its neglect an unimportant omission).
It rather leads to conclusions that challenge established beliefs about the robustness
of theoretical results (the advantage of centralized wage-bargaining), about em-
pirical relations (the determinants of the shape of the Calmfors-Driﬃll curve) and
about socio-political developments (the consequences of the formation of a monetary
union).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model which is
solved in section 3. In section 4 we derive comparative static results while section
5 analyzes the predictions of the model for a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n df o ra
4Cf. also Danthine and Hunt, 1994, 530; Hefeker, 1999, 39; Soskice and Iversen, 1998, 112.
9monetary union. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume that the world size is normalized to 1 and that ﬁrms and households over
the [0,γ] interval are located in the home country H while households and ﬁrms over
the [γ,1] interval are located in the foreign country F. The relative size of countries
H and F are thus γ and (1−γ), respectively. Firms are monpolistic competitors and
both economies are inhabited by KH (KF) unions that are distributed evenly across
the ﬁrms. As in Coricelli et al. (2000) we assume that the ﬁr m sa r ei n d e x e di ns u c h









of the interval [0,γ],w h e r ej =1 ,2...K H.I nc o u n t r yF,o n
the other hand, all ﬁrms to which union j∗ is attached are located in the subinterval h
γ +( 1− γ)
j∗−1




of the interval [γ,1],w h e r ej∗ =1 ,2...K F.T h e
level of real wages is the outcome of strategic interactions between the three groups
of actors: unions, ﬁrms and the central bank. The sequence of events is the following.
In the ﬁrst stage nominal wages are chosen by the unions. In the second stage ﬁrms
simultaneously choose prices, output and employment, taking as given the level of
nominal wages set in the ﬁrst stage. In the third stage the central bank determines
the money supply (and thereby nominal demand) according to its monetary policy
rule. Unions and ﬁrms know this monetary rule (and treat it as credible) and they
take it into account when deciding about the level of wages and prices. Finally–as
a fourth stage–the nominal exchange rate adjusts such that the balance of trade is
in equilibrium. The game is solved by backward induction.5
2.1 Preferences and the structure of demand
In the appendix we show that a microfounded framework (following Corsetti and

















∗)+γ(m − p)+( 1− γ)(m
∗ − p
∗), (2)
where all lower-case letters are log-variables, yh
i (y
f
i ) is the demand for the good
produced by home (foreign) ﬁrm i, ph
i (p
∗f
i ) is the price charged by this ﬁrm, pH
(p∗
F) is the consumption-based price index for goods produced in H (F), p (p∗)i st h e
total price index in H (F)a n dm (m∗) is the level of home (foreign) money supply.6
5Coricelli et al. (2000) use a diﬀerent sequenzing where unions move ﬁrst, followed by the
monetary authority and then by the ﬁrms. We believe, however, that our course of events is
probably more reasonable, since prices are in general stickier than interest rates and the exchange
rate.
6“Starred” variables are expressed in the foreign currency.
10The parameter γ m e a s u r e st h er e l a t i v es i z eo fc o u n t r yH and θ>1 measures the
elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country.





















H +( 1− γ)p
∗
F (6)
We assume that the law of one price holds, i.e. that p∗h
i + e = ph
i and p
∗f
i + e = p
f
i ,
where e is the (logarithm of the) nominal exchange rate. From the deﬁnition of the
price indices (3), (5), (4), and (6) it follows that the purchasing power parity also
holds for the composite commodities and the overall consumer price indices:
p
∗
H + e = pH, p
∗
F + e = pF and p
∗ + e = p (7)









yf(i)di, is given by the following expressions (using the deﬁnitions for
the price indices):
yH =( 1− γ)(pF − pH)+γ(m − p)+( 1− γ)(m
∗ − p
∗) (8)
yF = γ(pH − pF)+γ(m − p)+( 1− γ)(m
∗ − p
∗) (9)
From this we can derive a crucial relation in our model:
yH − yF = pF − pH (10)
We will return to this (terms of trade) equation later when we express it in terms
of unemployment-rate-diﬀerentials.
2.2 The Supply Side














i ) stands for the amount of labor employed by ﬁrm i in country H (F).






,β <1 would not qualitatively change
our analysis but would complicate the algebra.
112.3 Monetary Policy Rules
Both central banks are assumed to follow a monetary policy rule which states how
money supplies are adjusted in response to changes in the price level. In particular:





Here ˜ m and ˜ m∗ are exogenously given (or discretionary) parts of the monetary rule
while αH and αF measure how accommodating the monetary policy strategies are.
If, e.g., a monetary authority reacts restrictivly to a rise in the price level then its
degree of accommodation of monetary policy (AMP) will be low (α will
be small). We assume that αH,α F ∈ [−∞,1].A n e g a t i v e v a l u e o f α means that
the central bank reacts to an increase in p by decreasing money supply, whereas
a positive value implies that it (at least partly) accommodates the price increase.8
The assumption that central banks conduct their monetary policies according to the
rules (13) and (14) is rather speciﬁca n dn e e d ss o m ec l a r i ﬁcation. In particular we
want to discuss ﬁrst why we formulate monetary policy in terms of ﬁxed rules rather
than via the minimization of a loss function. Then we will brieﬂyt a l ka b o u tt h e
speciﬁcf o r mof the rules.
A rule-based speciﬁcation of monetary policy has been used by a number of au-
thors (e.g., Soskice and Iversen, 2000; Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999), while others
assume that monetary authorities actively choose their monetary policy by mini-
mizing a loss function (e.g., Cukierman and Lippi, 1999, 2001; Coricelli et al., 2000,
2001). It is also sometimes argued that this approach is superior to the one used
in our model, since the monetary reaction function is derived “explicitly from the
objectives and constraints of the monetary authorities and is therefore endogenous”
(Cukierman and Lippi, 2001, FN 4). We consider, however, the assumption of a
ﬁxed monetary rule to be a reasonable approximation to real world central bank be-
havior.9 In fact, empirical studies suggest that the behavior of major central banks
can be accurately described by assuming that they follow monetary policy rules.
Furthermore, as shown by Coricelli et al. (2000, 19), the monetary policy rules (13)
and (14) can be interpreted as reduced form expressions of endogenously derived op-
timal monetary reaction functions. Finally also the structure of our model suggests
the given formulation. Since we assume that the central bank is the last actor in our
(one-period) game it will take the prices (set by the ﬁr m si nt h es e c o n ds t a g e )a s
given and it will thus set the money supply in a way as to minimize unemployment–
completely independent of the developments of the price level. This is not the case
in Coricelli et al. (2000), where ﬁrms make their decisions after the central banks,
but in our set-up ﬁxed rules are the only reasonable assumption.
8Coricelli et al. (2000) also suggest that this is the correct range for α. Empirical reﬂections
on this topic can be found in Hall and Franzese Jr. (1998).
9Cf. Taylor (1993), also the comments by Bean (1998, 373).
12The speciﬁc form of the monetary policy rules is mainly chosen to keep our
derivations tractable and our results simple. Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), e.g.,
use a monetary policy rule that is speciﬁed in terms of the price level and of the
output gap. It can be shown, however, that in their closed-economy framework
this rule can be reduced to one that only contains a reaction to the price level.
Similarly we can also start in our open-economy model with monetary policy rules
that are speciﬁed over one nominal target (the price level or inﬂation) and one real




This expression, however, can again be reduced to a monetary policy rule that
only contains nominal variables, although in this case the price level of domestic
goods and of foreign goods separately.10 T h ec h o i c eo fa na p p r o p r i a t e( o re v e n
optimal) monetary policy rule is an interesting and important topic. In our static
and non-stochastic framework, however, this question is not so crucial, since diﬀerent
monetary policy rules will ultimately lead to the same “reduced forms” and thus–
qualitatively–also to the same results.
2.4 Exchange Rate Regimes
For the most part of this paper we assume that both countries have ﬂexible exchange
rates. Then the nominal exchange rate must adjust such as to clear goods and money
markets. In the set-up of our model it can be shown (see appendix) that the balance
of trade always equals zero and thus the nominal exchange rate must adjust to fulﬁll
the equilibrium condition M
P = M∗
P∗ (or m − p = m∗ − p∗).11 This can be stated
somewhat diﬀerently as a “monetary PPP” (using (7)):
m = e + m
∗ (15)
Under the assumption of a ﬂexible exchange rate regime we can thus calculate the








(˜ m − ˜ m
∗) (16)
In later parts of the paper, however, we will also analyze the cases where the two
countries are part of a ﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ea n do fam o n e t a r yu n i o n ,r e s p e c -
tively. In the case where country H pegs its nominal exchange rate at some level

















pF, for some constant ˆ m.
11This follows from the fact that in this model C = C∗ and from some quantity-theory-like
condition, which can also be derived from micro-principles (cf. Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987).
That the balance of trade equals zero is a reasonable property for a long run analysis and it is
a l s oo f t e nu s e di nd i ﬀerent open economy frameworks to “close the model” (cf., e.g., Layard et al.,
1991, 31ﬀ.).
12Since our model is static this is the correct (long-run) equilibrium value. For an intertemporal
model we would have to use a more elaborated framework along the lines of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1996, chap. 10).
13eH,tar it forgoes the possibility of independent monetary policy and instead of (13)
i t sm o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l ei sn o wg i v e nb y :
m =( 1− αF)e
H,tar + αFp +˜ m
∗ (17)
Note that in the ﬁxed exchange rate case the monetary policy of country H “mimics”
the foreign monetary policy rule, given by the “accommodation parameter” αF.
Finally in the case of a monetary union the (common) monetary policy is given
by:
m =˜ m + α¯ p, (18)
where m is now the per capita money supply of the whole union, α is the accom-
modation parameter of the common central bank and ¯ p = γp +( 1− γ)p∗ is the
union-wide target price level of the bank (i.e. a weighted average of the country-
speciﬁc price levels p and p∗).
3S o l u t i o n
Since the fourth stage (the determination of the exchange rate) and the third stage
(the setting of the money supplies) of the model are “predetermined” by equilibrium
conditions and monetary rules we can immediately start with the second stage.
3.1 The Firms’ Problem (Stage 2)
In the second stage all ﬁrms simultaneously maximize their proﬁts, taking as given
nominal wages wh
i and the prices set by the other ﬁrms (both in H and in F).13














is ﬁrm i’s mark-up (identical for all ﬁrms).
Aggregation across ﬁrms leads to the following price-setting equation:
pH = µ + wH, (20)





13We ﬁrst concentrate on the behavior in the home country under the ﬂexible exchange rate
regime. The behavior of foreign economic actors is equivalent and the results will only be stated
below. In later sections we will deal with the ﬁxed exchange rate and the monetary union regimes.
143.2 The Unions’ Problem (Stage 1)
In specifying the wage-setting process we assume that monopoly unions choose nom-
inal wages treating the wages chosen by the other unions as given and taking into
account the subsequent pricing decisions of ﬁrms, the monetary policy rules and
the equilibrium level of the exchange rate. Workers belong to one of KH identical
unions, where each union represents an equal share ˜ Lh
j =
˜ LH
KH of the total labor force
that has mass ˜ LH. For fully decentralized wage-setting there are as many unions
as ﬁrms (KH →∞ ), whereas completely centralized wage-setting means KH =1 .
As in Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) we let the parameter σH ≡ 1
KH denote the de-
gree of centralization of wage-bargaining (CWB), ranging from 0 (complete
decentralization) to 1 (complete centralization). Furthermore we assume that the



























where ˜ ω is the target level of real wages (that is identical across the unions), ΨH
measures the degree of unions’ relative concern for employment vis-à-vis the real
wage and ˜ lh
j =l n˜ Lh
j is deﬁned as above.15 Note furthermore that unions care
about the consumption wage wh
j − p rather than the product wage wh
j − pH.T h i s
is important for some of our later results since the terms of trade play a role, due
to the impact of foreign prices (and wages) on the domestic total price level p.








j − ˜ l
h
j)λH =0 , (22)










is the wage elasticity of labor demand.







































[1 − γ + γ(1 − αH)],
14A similar structure is also used by Coricelli et al. (2000).
15In equilibrium both the real wage and employment are below their respective targets (see




15In order to get expressions for the perceived impact of wage increases on prices















































































where LIML ≡ γ+(1−γ)[(j−1)/KF] and LIMH ≡ γ+(1−γ)[j/KF]. Since union j
correctly anticipates the price-setting equation (19) and since–due to the symmetry
of the problem–it also knows that all ﬁrms to which it is attached will charge the
same price (i.e., ph
ji = ph






























we can ﬁnally calculate that:
λH = θ(1 − σH)+σH(1 − γαH) > 0 (26)
In order to interpret this result it is important to note that equation (26) represents
only a reduced form while the wage elasticity of labor demand (of the ﬁrms covered
by union j) actually depends on the four eﬀects, given in (23). The ﬁrst eﬀect is that
a wage increase will trigger a price increase of the ﬁrm(s) covered by the union. This
rise in relative prices will result in a lower demand for the goods produced by the
ﬁrm and thus in a smaller (derived) demand for labor. This relative price eﬀect
(RPE) is captured by the ﬁrst term in (26) and in (23). The (absolute) magnitude
of this eﬀect is larger for high values of θ (i.e. for a high degree of competition on
the goods market) and for small values of σH (i.e. for small degrees of centralization
in wage-setting). Looking only at this eﬀect in isolation implies that a high CWB
leads to a smaller elasticity of labor demand and thus–ceteris paribus–to lower
levels of employment.
But there exist three additional eﬀects that are only present for non-atomistic
unions (σH 6=0 )a n dt h a tw o r ki nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n .T h es u mo ft h e s ee ﬀects are
captured by the term σH(1− γαH) in equation (26) and we refer to this expression





16as the (total) real balance eﬀect (RBE).17 The mechanisms underlying this total
real balance eﬀect are, however, more complicated than one would expect by just
looking at the simple algebraic expression in (26).
First there is a terms of trade eﬀect (or “international competitiveness ef-
fect”), given by the second term in (23), that has a straightforward meaning. A
higher price of domestic goods leads to a substitution eﬀect where consumers in
both countries switch from the more expensive home products to the now cheaper
foreign products. The eﬀect comes out as (1 − γ)σH and is thus larger for more
centralized unions and for smaller countries (where a larger part of the product
demand stems from abroad).
Second there is a domestic real balance eﬀect. An increase in domestic prices
translates into a γ% increase in the domestic price index thereby lowering (for a ﬁxed
money supply) real balances and real demand by another γ% (cf. 1). This can be
accommodated or further strengthened (depending on αH ≷ 0)b yt h em o n e t a r y
policy reaction (given by (13)). The eﬀect can be calculated as: γ2σH(1 − αH)
and is thus increasing in the CWB, decreasing in the AMP and increasing in the
country size. In small countries most demand comes from abroad and thus both the
eﬀects on domestic demand and the domestic monetary policy reaction are rather
unimportant.
Finally there is also a foreign real balance eﬀect (given by the last term in
(23)) which is the most complicated mechanism in this framework, since it itself
involves separate subeﬀects on foreign demand, foreign monetary policy and on the
exchange rate. To start with, the increase in the price index pH of home-produced
goods also increases (for a ﬁxed exchange rate) the foreign price level p∗ which will
reduce foreign real demand for the home products, where the reaction of foreign
monetary policy can again mitigate or strengthen these consequences (depending on
αF ≷ 0). This eﬀect is given by: γ(1−γ)σH(1−αF). But in addition the (possibly
diﬀerent) monetary policy reactions in the two countries have an impact on the
e q u i l i b r i u me x c h a n g er a t ew h i c hc a na l t e rt h ei n ﬂuence on foreign demand. The total
impact of the exchange rate on foreign demand is given by: γ(1 − γ)σH(αH − αF).
If the central bank in H is more accommodating (i.e. αH >α F) then this will lead
to an increase in e, i.e. to a depreciation of H’s currency. The total foreign real
balance eﬀect can then be calculated as: γ(1 − γ)σH(1 − αH).A s a p p a r e n t f r o m
this expression the exchange rate eﬀect counteracts some of the other eﬀects such
that, e.g., the foreign AMP plays no role anymore.
As this discussion shows the total real balance eﬀect consists of various, partly
counteracting eﬀects that have an inﬂuence on the demand for domestic products
and that are (partly) internalized by non-atomistic unions.18 Of course one could
17We borrow the expressions for the “relative price eﬀect” and the “real balance eﬀect” from
Coricelli et al. (2000) in order to facilitate a comparison to their (related) work. Cukierman and
Lippi (1999, 2001) have called these eﬀects in a somewhat diﬀerent model the “adverse competition”
and the “strategic” eﬀects, respectively.
18Note that for σH =0the real balance eﬀe c ti sn o tp r e s e n ta n dw ea r el e f tw i t ht h es t a n d a r d
17argue that this requires a high degree of rationality and sophistication of union
leaders. Nevertheless it is useful to take this framework as a benchmark case where
all of these various eﬀects are explicitly taken into account.
The total real balance eﬀect, given by σH(1−γαH),t h u si n c r e a s e si nt h eC W B
and decreases in the AMP. As far as the country size is concerned one has to dis-
tinguish between the cases αH ≷ 0. If the monetary policy is accommodating (in
the sense that αH > 0) it is “better” to be small, since then the loose policy can-
not have a large damaging impact on the perceived elasticity of labor demand. On
the other hand it is advantageous to be a large country when the monetary policy
is non-accommodating (i.e. αH < 0) since then the restrictive policy has a more
“threatening” impact on unions’ behavior.
Summarizing the discussion so far, an increase in CWB has two eﬀects on the
elasticity of labor demand that work into opposite directions: it will reduce the
elasticity through the relative price eﬀect and increase it through the real balance
eﬀect. But these are not the only channel through which the CWB inﬂuences wages
and unemployment. In deciding about the optimal nominal wage claims the unions
do not only look at the reaction of labor demand, but also at the real wage (wh
j −p)
(cf. (22)). Thereby it is important how the unions perceive that a one unit increase
in nominal wages is transformed into an increase in the real (consumption) wage.
This elasticity of the union’s real wage with respect to the nominal wage is given
by: ZH =1− γσH. The smaller ZH the more moderate the union’s wage claims
will be, since it understands that excessive nominal wages will only be reﬂected
in identical price increases leaving the real wage almost unchanged. Thus more
centralized (high σH) wage-setting institutions will lead to more wage moderation.
Wage claims will also be lower in large countries (high γ), since there the impact of
a “wage-price-spiral” is fully felt and perceived.
Returning now to the derivation of the wage-setting behavior we can use (22) to
write the target wage of union j as:
w
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and the latter equality
follows from the fact that (lh
j −˜ lh
j) ≈− uh
j. Since all unions are identical in this frame-
work we will get a symmetric solution with uh
j = uH and wh
j = wH. Aggregation of
(27) thus leads to the aggregate wage-setting equation: wH =˜ ω + p −
ΨHλH
ZH uH
which can also be written as:




Using the price-setting equation (20) and the wage-setting equation (28) we can
derive the equilibrium level of unemployment (holding for the moment the terms of
relative price eﬀect.




[µ +˜ ω +( 1− γ)(pF − pH)] (29)
We can illustrate this in a simple, well-known picture (cf. Layard et. all, 1991).
The price-setting equation (20) implies that the level of real wages is constant and
given by −µH,t h i si sd r a w na st h eh o r i z o n t a ll i n ei nF i g u r e1 . 19 The wage-setting
equation on the other hand shows a negative relation between the rate of unem-
ployment and the real (product) wage (or a positive between the latter and the rate
o fe m p l o y m e n t ,a sd r a w ni nF i g u r e1 ) .T h es l o p eo ft h el i n ei sd e t e r m i n e db yt h e
fraction
λH
ZH.T h e l a r g e r
λH
ZH t h el o w e rt h er a t eo fu n e m p l o y m e n t( a l w a y sf o rg i v e n
(pF −pH)). An increase in λH and a decrease in ZH will thus both lead to a decrease
in the unemployment rate and the consequences of a change in a country’s mone-
tary or labor market institutions can be studied by looking at these two elasticities.
A decrease in accommodating monetary policy (i.e. a decrease in αH), e.g., will
increase λH and leave ZH unchanged, thereby causing a reduction in the rate of
unemployment. If the central bank does not accommodate increases in the price-
level then a wage increase will result in a larger drop in real balances, in aggregate
demand and thus also in derived labor demand. Unions will anticipate this chain
of events and thus moderate their wage claims in the ﬁrst place which has positive
eﬀects on employment. Since in our framework the equilibrium real wage is given
by (20) the unemployment rate is the primary “disciplinary device” that moderates
unions’ wage claims. If unions’ “fear of unemployment” increases for other reasons
(e.g. via a decrease in αH)l e s so ft h i sd e v i c ei sn e e d e da n dt h eu n e m p l o y m e n t
rate will decrease in equilibrium. The eﬀect of an increase in centralization is less
clear-cut, since it aﬀects the slope
λH
ZH through three channels and we will discuss
this extensively in a later section.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
So far, however, we have conducted our analysis under the assumption that the
terms of trade (pF −pH) are constant. In fact they are also determined endogenously
and in order to investigate the general equilibrium we have to determine the wage
and price-setting equations of the foreign country.
3.3 The Foreign Country
Similar reasoning as applied in the derivations of the preceding sections gives rise
to corresponding aggregate price-setting and wage-setting equations for the foreign
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= θ(1 − σF)+σF[1 − (1 − γ)αF]
















[µ +˜ ω + γ(pH − pF)], (32)
where the last step follows from the fact that p∗
H − p∗
F = pH − pF. All variables are
deﬁned in the same way as the corresponding variables for H and we have assumed
that home and foreign unions have the same target level of real wages ˜ ω.
So far, however, we still have not found the equilibrium unemployment rates for
H and F since both (29) and (32) still depend on the terms of trade TOT ≡ pF −pH.
For closing the model we thus have to refer to equation (10) that relates the terms
of trade to the ratio of the average output of the two countries. In the appendix we
show that this equation can be expressed in terms of unemployment rates as:
TOT ≡ pF − pH = uF − uH (33)
T h er a t i oo fu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e si se q u a lt ot h e( l o g a r i t h mo ft h e )t e r m so ft r a d e .
Production is lower in the country where the prices of domestically produced goods
are higher which also causes a lower level of employment.
3.4 The Equilibrium
Equations (29), (32) and (33) can now be solved for the equilibrium rates of unem-
ployment and of the terms of trade. Since we want to concentrate in the following
on the relation between the structure of wage bargaining and monetary policy, both
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(µ +˜ ω)(λHZF − λFZH)
γλHZF +( 1− γ)λFZH + λHλF
(36)
where (as a reminder):
λH = θ(1 − σH)+σH(1 − γαH) > 0 (37)
λF = θ(1 − σF)+σF[1 − (1 − γ)αF] > 0
ZH =1 − γσH > 0
ZF =1 − (1 − γ)σF > 0
In the next sections we want to analyze the properties of this equilibrium.
4T h e I n ﬂuence of Monetary Policy and of Wage-
Setting Institutions
What happens to the unemployment rates in the two countries if the CWB or
the AMP in one of the two countries changes? Since a country’s monetary and
wage-bargaining institutions are not strictly exogenously given (although often quite
persistent) one can–with some caution–also interpret the results of this section as
giving the incentives for countries to undertake reforms of these institutions.
4.1 The Impact of Changes in Monetary Policy (AMP)
We start with the question how a move towards a more accommodating monetary
policy (an increase in αH) changes the unemployment rates. The answer is given in
the following proposition.20
Proposition 1 An increase in the home (foreign) degree of accommodation of mon-





Equilibrium unemployment increases in the degree of accommodation of mone-
tary policy. The reason for this result has again to do with the (perceived) elasticities
of labor demand given in (37). If unions know that high nominal wage demands
will trigger a harsh reaction by the central bank then they will moderate their wage
claims in the ﬁrst place. Less of the “disciplinary device” unemployment is necessary
when non-accommodating monetary policy serves as an alternative “disciplinary de-
vice”.
20All proofs are collected in the appendix.
21A similar result was derived by Coricelli et al. (2000, 14), who also show that if
unions are not inﬂation-averse (as is the case in our model) unemployment always
decreases in the degree of central bank independence (which itself is negatively
correlated to the degree of accommodation). In this respect it is optimal to have
an “ultra-conservative” central bank that (credibly) threatens to react extremely
restrictive to the slightest rise in prices. One would assume, however, that the
introduction of uncertainty, exogenous shocks etc. would change this result along
the lines of the classic paper by Rogoﬀ (1985).
The next question is how the change in one country’s monetary policy aﬀects
the other country.
Proposition 2 (i) An increase in the degree of accommodation of home (foreign)




∂αH > 0. (ii) The impact of a change in monetary policy is always larger









The ﬁrst part of the proposition shows that the “spillover eﬀects” of mone-
tary policy reforms always work in the same direction in both countries. A more
accommodating monetary policy in the home country will thus lead to higher un-
employment in both the home and the foreign country, whereas a move towards a
more non-accommodating policy will decrease unemployment in both nations. As
the second part of the proposition shows, however, the eﬀect is always larger in the
country where the reform has taken place. In order to see this note that from (29)










=0 . From (28),(20),(31) and (30)
it follows that this will tend to increase pH and decrease pF. In principle it would be
p o s s i b l et h a tt h i sT O Te ﬀect overturns the original eﬀect of an increase in αH.I n
the present model, however, this is not the case and the “direct” eﬀect of a change
in the AMP is always larger than the “indirect” eﬀect of a change in the TOT that
is triggered by the direct eﬀect.
4.2 The impact of Changes in Centralization (CWB)
One of the central topics in the literature on strategic interactions deals with the
question how the CWB and (structural) unemployment are related. As we will
see this relation is somewhat more complicated than the one between AMP and
unemployment, since it involves opposing eﬀects and leads to ambiguous conclusions.
Proposition 3 An increase in the degree of home (foreign) wage-bargaining cen-
tralization will decrease home (foreign) unemployment if good markets are uncompet-
itive, monetary policy is non-accommodating and the country is large. In particular:
∂uH




∂σF < 0 for P2 ≡
1−αF(1−γ)
θγ > 1.
T h em e c h a n i s m sb e h i n dt h i sr e s u l ta r ethe following. Focusing on the home
country an increase in the degree of centralization has a negative eﬀect on the
22elasticity of labor demand λH (through the relative price eﬀect) and a positive eﬀect
(through the real balance eﬀect) [cf. (26)]. The total eﬀect on λH,i st h e nu n c l e a r
and depends on the relative size of these two eﬀects. Furthermore an increase in σH
also leads to a better understanding of unions that their attempts to increase the
real wage are more or less useless since a rise in nominal wages will be followed by a
corresponding increase in prices. An increase in σH will thus lower ZH and will tend
to decrease unemployment. The total impact of all three eﬀects, however, remains
unclear and depends on the parameters of monetary policy (αH), product market
competitiveness (θ) and country size (γ).
As far as monetary policy is concerned it is stated in proposition 3 that a
rise in CWB will tend to reduce unemployment if monetary policy is rather non-
accommodating (αH is small). This follows from the positive eﬀects of CWB on the
elasticity of labor demand (λH) via the real balance eﬀect. Larger (more centralized)
unions recognize that a wage increase leads to a fall in aggregate demand, where the
fall is further aggravated by a more non-accommodating central bank. The internal-
ization of the real balance eﬀect, caused by the increase in CWB, has a larger impact
on unemployment the more “threatening” (i.e. non-accommodating) the monetary
policy of the central bank. Furthermore in large countries (high γ) the domestic
price level is mostly the result of the decisions of domestic price and wage setters.
Therefore the wage-restraining eﬀects of a non-accommodating monetary policy are
also more pronounced there. In small countries on the other hand the unions see
that their (possibly excessive) wage claims are to a large degree “exported” and that
they cannot inﬂuence the behavior of foreign price-setters, wage-setters and central
banks. But there is a second eﬀect which makes an increase in CWB more positive
in large countries, the ZH eﬀect. As said above this eﬀect is also more pronounced
if a larger part of the price index is set domestically and is thus also inﬂuenced by
the decisions of domestic unions. Taking these two channels together it is thus more
likely that an increase in CWB will cause a decrease in unemployment if the country
is large.21 Still there is always a negative eﬀect of more centralization. If unions get
larger they “control” the wage negotiations of a larger part of the market, thereby
lowering competition (relative price eﬀect). This eﬀect is bigger the more competi-
t i v et h eg o o d sm a r k e t sa r ei nt h eﬁrst place (i.e. the higher is θ). If the relative price
eﬀect is large enough it can always overturn the positive eﬀects of centralization.
It is interesting to relate our result to similar results in Coricelli et al. (2000)
w h oa n a l y z ear e l a t e dclosed-economy model. Their proposition 3 (p. 22) states
that the rate of unemployment always decreases in the CWB. This is also the case
in our model. For γ =1(which corresponds to a closed-economy assumption)22
we have P1 > 1 so that in this case we get that
∂uH
∂σH < 0, independent of the
21In fact the ﬁrst eﬀect of the country size is negative if the monetray policy is accommodating
(αH > 0) .B u te v e ni nt h i sc a s et h et o t a le ﬀect of country size is positive, since the (positive) ZH
eﬀect is stronger than the (now negative) real-balance eﬀect.
22This is not quite true, since the market is larger due to the fact that both, inhabitants of H
and of F, only consume goods produced in H.
23other parameters of the model. Coricelli et al. (2000) argue that their model “does
not generate the ‘hump-shaped’ relation between unemployment and labor market
centralization stressed by Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) [...]. However, this result
is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that countries with a high degree
of coordination in wage setting have lower unemployment (Nickell, 1997; OECD,
1997)” (p. 22). Similar to this result our model does not produce a hump-shape
relation between (home-country) unemployment and (home-country) wage central-
ization. It does not predict, however, that the relation is necessarily negative. For
certain constellations of country size, APM and goods market competition it may
well be positive. Proposition 3 thus qualiﬁes the results of Coricelli et al.(2000)
by showing that in the case of open economies the relation between unemployment
a n dC W Bc a ng oi nb o t hd i r e c t i o n s . I nC u k ierman and Lippi (1999, propositions
2 and 3), on the other hand, the relation between unemployment and CWB might
be hump-shaped, although only when unions are suﬃciently inﬂation-averse. For
the case where they are not concerned about inﬂation (as in our model) the relation
is always positive. Again this could also occur in our model for certain parameter
constellations.23
Finally we want relate proposition 3 to empirical observations, where we ﬁrst
want to repeat that the results of the proposition can–with some caution–also be
interpreted as stating the incentives to (de)centralize wage-bargaining, depending
on P1 ≷ 1 and P2 ≷ 1. T h er e c e n ty e a r sh a v es h o w n( a tl e a s ti nE u r o p e )v a r i o u s
attempts and eﬀorts to deregulate goods markets, to break up monopolies and to
foster competition. In the language of our model this would be captured by an
increase in θ. At the same time one could observe increasing market integration, a
rise in international trade and a process of “globalization”. A larger fraction of the
goods a country consumes is now produced abroad which corresponds in our model
to a decrease in γ. All countries got more integrated and thus “smaller” in economic
terms, i.e. in the sense that they depend more on foreign-produced goods.24 Both
developments–deregulation and globalization–have thus increased the likelihood
that a decentralized wage-bargaining system is advantageous. A movement in this
direction could in fact be observed in various European countries over the recent
years (cf. Wallerstein and Golden, 2000; Calmfors, 2000, 6f.), thereby broadly
23As an aside it is interesting to note that similar modelling frameworks can produce such diverse
and contradicting results. Coricelli et al. (2000, 33) discuss some of the reasons that lie behind
these diﬀerences. The main reason can be found in the fact that Cukierman and Lippi (1999)
and Guzzo and Velasco (1999) deal with situations where the central banks can set the price level
directly whereas in the framework of Coricelli et al. (2000), Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) and in
our model they can only inﬂuence prices by changing the money supply and thus also nominal
demand.
24Strictly speaking in our model it is not possible that both countries get smaller in this sense. To
capture this process in a precise manner we would have to introduce a non-traded goods sector that
shrinks over the course of globalization. Nevertheless we can use the decrease of γ to approximate
these developments.
24conﬁrming the predictions of our model.25
The next proposition captures the impact of “other-country” changes in CWB
on “own-country” unemployment.
Proposition 4 (i) An increase in the degree of home (foreign) wage-bargaining
centralization will decrease foreign (home) unemployment in all cases where it also
decreases home (foreign) unemployment and vice versa, i.e.
∂uF
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The proposition implies that an increase in foreign wage centralization will lead to
a reduction in domestic unemployment in all cases where it also leads to a reduction
in foreign unemployment. By the same token an increase in domestic centralization
will reduce foreign unemployment exactly when it also decreases domestic unemploy-
ment. Thus in our model the success of such changes (or reforms) is a “win-win”
or a “lose-lose” phenomenon, not a “beggar-thy-neighbors” situation. All countries
in a common market proﬁt from a successful labor market reform in one member
country and they suﬀer from an unsuccessful one.
As the second part of proposition 4 shows, the eﬀect of a change in CWB is
always more pronounced in the country where it originated. If an increase in home-
country CWB increases unemployment in H (i.e. P1 < 1) then it will also increase
unemployment in F but by less than in H.A n d i f t h e i n c r e a s e i n σH leads to
a reduction of unemployment in H and in F (i.e. P1 > 1) then the latter eﬀect
is smaller than the former. The intuition behind this result is parallel to the one
discussed for the result of proposition 2 (ii).
Combining propositions 3 and 4 we can now ask ourselves if it is possible to
have a parameter constellation where an increase in CWB has a positive eﬀect on
unemployment, regardless of the country where this shift takes place. This question
arises since
∂uH
∂σH < 0 is only possible if country H is “rather large” while
∂uF
∂σF < 0
c a no n l yh a p p e ni fc o u n t r yF is “rather large”. For this to be the case we must




θ−αF . So if the two countries are not too diﬀerent in size and/or if
the goods markets are not too competitive such a situation might well be possible.
In fact for θ → 1 the condition reduces to 0 <γ<1 (which is always fulﬁlled),
while for θ →∞it becomes 1 <γ<0 (which is never fulﬁlled). In the case
where the condition is fulﬁl l e dw ec a nt h e r e f o r ec o n c l u d et h a tt h es a m er e f o r m
(i.e., a move towards a more centralized wage-bargaining system) is positive for
both countries. But the reverse case can also happen, especially when the size
25This is, however, not true for the third inﬂuential parameter, since monetary policies have
most probably become more non-accommodating over the recent decades, which–according to
our model–should have increased the incentives to centralize the wage-bargaining system. Our
m o d e lt h u ss u g g e s t st h a tt h eﬁrst two eﬀects (on θ and γ) must have been larger than the latter,
such that the incentive to decentralize prevailed.
25of countries is quite diverse. Then it could, e.g., be the case that an increase in
CWB is positive for country H (and by the spillover eﬀects also for F)w h i l et h e
same move (an increase in σF)i sn e g a t i v ef o rF (and also for H). A labor market
reform that is advantageous for one (large) country can thus be disadvantageous
for another (smaller) country. This conﬁrms the opinion that a “one-size-ﬁts-all”
approach to the reform of labor market institutions is problematic. In this respect
our model can be viewed as lending support to the EU initiatives in this area, where,
e.g., the Amsterdam Treaty fosters cooperation and the exchange of information
between the member states, while explicitly stating that “the competencies of the
Member States shall be respected” (article 127) and that cooperation does “not
include harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States” (article
128).
Finally we can relate the results of our model to the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis,
where the relative performance of countries with respect to their (structural) unem-
ployment rate is contrasted to their (own) degree of wage bargaining centralization
(σH in the language of our model). Empirical tests of this hypothesis have been
rather unsuccessful or at least controversial (OECD, 1997, S. 83). Our model, how-
ever, suggests that the neglect of open-economy issues could be (partly) responsible
for the poor empirical performance of the original Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis. In





ZH > 1. The country ranking with respect to unemployment rates thus
depends not only on the own CWB (σH and σF, respectively), but rather on the
CWB in both countries, the AMP in both countries, the relative country size γ and
the competitiveness of the goods market θ. The result itself is perhaps not very
surprising if one considers that we work with a general equilibrium model. Never-
theless we think it is important to note that even our simple model suggests that
the original version of the Calmfors-Driﬃll hypothesis omits crucial variables and
that the ranking of unemployment rates depends, e.g., not only on a country’s own
CWB (σH)b u ta l s oo ni t srelative CWB vis-à-vis the one of the foreign country
(σF).
5D i ﬀerent Monetary Regimes
So far we have studied the case of an international monetary regime where exchange
rates are ﬂexible and determined by the relative money supplies of the two countries
(cf. equation (16)). In this section we want to investigate how the results change for
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime and for a monetary union. It is frequently argued that
the formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) could change wage formation
and thus structural and cyclical unemployment rates in the member countries (cf.
Soskice and Iversen, 1998; Cukierman and Lippi, 2001). Since this is a broad and
important issue we will only brieﬂy discuss some results in the following, while a
more extensive treatment can be found in Knell (2001).
265.1 Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
F i r s tw ew a n tt ol o o ka tt h ec a s ew h e r ec o u n t r yH follows a ﬁxed exchange rate
policy vis-à-vis country F and (credibly) pegs its currency at some level eH,tar.A s
shown in section 2.4 this means that it forgoes the possibility of conducting an
independent monetary policy and that it has to “mimic” the monetary policy of the
foreign country. Instead of the autonomous rule (13) its monetary policy rule is now
given by: m =( 1− αF)eH,tar + αFp +˜ m∗ (this is equation (17)).
As apparent from (34) and (35) the crucial parameters determining unemploy-
ment in our model are the elasticities of labor demand (λ) and the elasticities of the
unions’ real wage with respect to the nominal wage (Z). These can be calculated
from the demand equations of the two countries (parallel to the derivations for the
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∗ (39)
Using (38) and (39) and assuming that all other parameters stay constant it is
straightforward to calculate the crucial elasticities:
λ
fix
H = θ(1 − σH)+σH(1 − γαF) > 0 (40)
λ
fix
F = λF = θ(1 − σF)+σF(1 − (1 − γ)αF) > 0
Z
fix
H = ZH =1− γσH > 0
Z
fix
F = ZF =1− (1 − γ)σF > 0
It thus follows that a ﬁxed exchange rate regime is equivalent to the case where H
copies the monetary policy of country F. In analyzing this regime we can therefore
use the results of section 4 with α
fix
H = αF. Furthermore, without loss of generality
and for ease of exposition, we assume that α
flex
H >α F, i.e. that the autonomous
monetary policy of H was more accommodating than the one of F.T h i si sm e a n t
to reﬂect the case of the EMS where the member countries were induced to follow
the monetary policy of the German Bundesbank, arguably the least accommodating
central bank in the area.
Using propositions 1 and 2 we can now investigate the eﬀect of the introduction of
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime on the labor market performance of the two countries.
Since (from assumption) α
flex




∂αH > 0 we can conclude that
unemployment rates will decrease in both countries, where the decrease in H is larger
(cf. proposition 2(ii)). The regime change is thus advantageous for both countries
(a “Pareto improvement”), although we want to note again that due to the absence
of any shocks our model is not suitable for studying the stabilizing properties of the
v a r i o u se x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e s .
275.2 Monetary Union
In this section we want to move one step further and investigate what impact the
formation of a monetary union (MU) will have on the labor market performance of
the member countries. In fact it is often argued that the formation of EMU will
aﬀect unemployment and inﬂation in all member countries even if the structural
parameters stay the same. The main reason for this prediction is that “with the
formation of the monetary union all unions become smaller relative to the mone-
tary area (i.e. the monetary union reduces the wage share of each single union).
This decreases their perception of the inﬂationary repercussions of their individual
wages, inducing them to more aggressive wage demands” (Cukierman and Lippi,
2001, 541; similarly: Hefeker, 1999, 39). Even the European Commission has taken
up this line of reasoning and refers to it in a recent publication (cf. Cukierman
and Lippi, 2001, FN1). The argument itself was formalized, e.g., by Soskice and
Iversen (1998), Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001). In
all of these papers, however, the member countries of the monetary union are only
linked through a common central bank. Neither before the formation of the MU
nor afterwards do they have any trade connections or other international linkages.
Therefore changes in the price levels abroad do not have an impact on the home
country via competitiveness or consumption wage eﬀects but only indirectly via the
fact that the common central bank will react to the induced eﬀects on the union-
wide price level. Clearly this is an unrealistic scenario that furthermore begs the
question why these countries should have formed a MU in the ﬁrst place since the
standard arguments for such a far-reaching decision are normally based on expected
trade-enhancing eﬀects. In our model on the other hand we do have international
t r a d eb e f o r ea n dh e r et h em o v ef r o maﬁx e de x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e( l i k et h eE M S )
to a monetary union (like EMU) does not give rise to the unemployment-increasing
eﬀects stated above. If the common central bank will follow the same monetary
policy rule as the anchor country in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime (i.e. α = αF)
then, in fact, there is no change at all.
In order to see this we have to look at the demand functions in the MU, where
the central bank follows the monetary rule: m =˜ m+α¯ p,, (cf. equation (18))26 and
where the union-wide price level is given by ¯ p = γp+( 1− γ)p∗.S i n c eam o n e t a r y
union means that the nominal exchange rate is permanently ﬁxed at E =1(or










i − pF) − γ(pF − pH)+( m − ¯ p) (42)
Due to the preference structure the price level in both countries is the same, p = p∗,
26Note that in our framework m measures the per capita money supply.
28and following the steps from the previous sections we can derive:
λ
MU
H = θ(1 − σH)+σH(1 − γα) > 0 (43)
λ
MU
F = θ(1 − σF)+σF(1 − (1 − γ)α) > 0
Z
MU
H =1 − γσH > 0
Z
MU
F =1 − (1 − γ)σF > 0
So there is no change in the λ
0s and Z0s as compared to the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime if one assumes that α = αF , i.e. if the common central bank behaves the
same way as the central bank of the former anchor-country. The formation of the
MU has real eﬀects only insofar as the degree of AMP changes (i.e., e.g., if α<α F),
but this is also the case if a country enters a less accommodating ﬁxed exchange rate
regime.27 At ﬁrst this result seems counterintuitive and in the following we want to
explain why the aforementioned claims about the detrimental eﬀects of a MU in the
face of strategic interactions do not arise in our model.
The main reason for our result is the simple fact that for an open economy the
move towards a MU is not such a big change after all. Due to the fact that both
competitiveness (measured by the terms of trade) and the consumption wage are
dependent on foreign prices and foreign demand the optimizing unions have always
looked across the border and they have always taken the international situation into
consideration when deciding about their nominal wage claims. Furthermore the
traditional argument seems to ignore the fact that national central banks also react
to foreign wage settlements insofar as these are included in import prices and thus
in the domestic price level. These international linkages will dampen the negative
consequences of the formation of a MU. Speciﬁc assumptions of our model lead to
the extreme conclusion that the eﬀect of a MU is nil.
In particular this is due to our preference structure where the price level is the
same in all countries, i.e. p = p∗ =¯ p = γpH +( 1− γ)pF. From this we can see
that it does not make a diﬀerence whether a central bank targets the price level of
one single country or a (population-weighted) average ¯ p of the whole union.28 Put
diﬀerently the price level that is relevant for the unions (namely the consumer price
indices p and p∗, respectively) are the same ones that are targeted by the central
bank, both before and after the formation of the MU. In the existing studies on MU
(Cukierman and Lippi, 2001; Soskice and Iversen, 1998) it is typically maintained–
contrary to our model–that national unions only look at national prices, while the
common central bank looks at a weighted average of all price levels. But this only
holds for the (unrealistic and often only implicitly made) assumption that the MU
is formed by closed economies. A second assumption that is crucial for our result
is of course that unions have perfect foresight and perfect information about the
27If the MU substitutes a ﬂexible exchange rate regime the impact on the unemplyoment rates
depends on αH R α, αF R α and the other parameters of the model (cf. Knell, 2001).
28In fact it does not even matter which weights the common central bank uses. A “country-
weighted” average, e.g., leads to the same result: 1
2p + 1
2p∗ =¯ p.
29monetary rules of both central banks and about the equilibrium exchange rate and
that they act in a completely rational way. Finally we want to note that this result
could be sensitive to the way how monetary policy is formulated. We have modelled
central bank behavior via ﬁxed monetary policy rules instead of assuming that they
minimize a loss function that includes inﬂation and unemployment (cf. section 2.3).
These (and other) assumptions could be relaxed in order to reintroduce real eﬀects
of the formation of a MU into our model, but these extensions are left for future
research.
This, however, does not mean that we would not expect any impact of EMU on
the level of euro area structural unemployment. As argued, among others, by Calm-
fors (1998, 2000), Mélitz (1997), Pissarides (1997) and Burda (1999) the formation
of EMU is likely to lead to changes in the economic and institutional environment
of European goods and labor markets. In section 4.2 we have brieﬂy discussed how
EMU-induced changes in the economic environment (deregulation, globalization)
could trigger changes in the institutional environment (decentralization of wage-
bargaining) which will of course have an impact on structural unemployment (cf.
Knell, 2001). The eﬀect of the changes in the strategic environment could, however,
be smaller than commonly expected.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have studied the determinants of unemployment in a world with
two countries that are connected by foreign trade. We have shown that some of
the results appearing in the recent literature on strategic interactions are not robust
with respect to the introduction of an open economy structure. Furthermore we have
shown that the model implies that the shape of the Calmfors-Driﬃll curve not only
depends on a country’s own CWB but rather on home and foreign characteristics.
The last important result of our paper is related to the consequences of the formation
of a monetary union. Models that are set in a closed economy strategic interaction
framework normally reach the conclusion that the formation of a monetary union will
alter the incentives and strategic interactions of the economic agents (in particular of
unions and monetary policy makers) and will lead to a more aggressive wage-setting
behavior and to higher structural unemployment. We show that this result is not
generally valid in an open economy framework. In particular our model suggests
that if the countries forming the monetary union were part of a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime before and if the common central bank of the monetary union is as non-
accommodating as was the anchor central bank of the ﬁxed exchange rate system
then there is no unemployment eﬀect whatsoever.
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Structure of the model:
The demand structure of our model is based on Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998). We assume that the world size is normalized to 1 and
that ﬁrms and households over the [0,γ] interval are located in the home country H
while households and ﬁrms over the [γ,1] interval are located in the foreign country
F. The relative size of countries H and F are thus γ and (1 − γ), respectively.
Furthermore we assume (as discussed, e.g., in Tille, 2001) that there are two types
of goods and each country specializes in the production of one type. Each type of
goods, however, is produced in a continuous variety of brands. Finally we assume
that the degree of substitutability across types of goods is 1 while the one across
brands is given by θ.
In particular we use the following utility function (for a representative household,
suppressing the index i):29






γγ(1 − γ)1−γ (44)




























where θ>1. The elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country
is thus given by θ, while the one between the composite home and foreign goods
is 1 (cf. Tille, 2001), implying that there is less substitutability across types than
across brands. For the foreign country a similar preference structure holds, i.e.




γγ(1−γ)1−γ ,w h e r eC∗
H and C∗
F are again CES-subindexes of composite
home and foreign commodity bundles.





























29The indices CH and CF must therefore be understood as per capita values.
31where Ph(i) is the price charged by the home ﬁrm i, PH (PF) is the home-currency
consumption-based price index for goods produced in H (F), P is the total price
index in H and P∗ is the total price index in F (expressed in foreign currency).
Again, equivalent expressions hold for the foreign-currency consumption-based price
indices. We assume that the law of one price holds across all individual goods, i.e.
Ph(i)=εP ∗
h(i) and Pf(i)=εP ∗
f(i) where P∗
h(i) (P∗
f(i))d e n o t e st h ep r i c eo fh o m e
(foreign) goods in the foreign country and ε is the nominal exchange rate. The
indices (48), (49) and (47) thus imply that purchasing power parity holds for the
overall consumption price indices:
P = εP
∗ (50)




















where CW ≡ [γC +( 1− γ)C∗] and C (C∗) is total consumption of a representative
household in H (F). Since in this model it holds that C = C∗ = CW (see Obstfeld







PHyh = PFyf, (54)
where YH ≡
R γ
0 Yh(i)di and YF ≡
R 1
γ Yf(i)di, while yh and yf stand for the demand
faced by a representative ﬁrm in H and F, respectively.
Furthermore we assume some quantity-theory-like relation between money and
(nominal) demand30,i . e .M = C/P and M∗ = C∗/P ∗,s u c ht h a tw ec a nw r i t et h e



































From the equilibrium relation C = C∗ it thus follows that M
P = M∗
P∗ or (from 50):
M = εM
∗ (57)
30This can also be derived in a maximizing framework (cf. Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987).
32Finally we linearize the demand functions (by taking logarithms of (55) and (56)























H)+γ(m − p)+( 1− γ)(m
∗ − p
∗)




















p = γpH +( 1− γ)pF
p
∗ = p − e
This is the structure of the model we use in the paper.31
Equation (33): We assume that each ﬁrm has access to a labor force of mass
˜ Lh
i , where we also assume that this ﬁrm-speciﬁc pool of workers is the same for
all ﬁrms, i.e. ˜ Lh
i = ˜ Lh, ˜ L
f
i = ˜ Lf and ˜ Lh = ˜ Lf = ˜ L. The total labor force in
the two countries is therefore given by: ˜ LH =
R γ
0 ˜ Lhdi = γ˜ L and ˜ LF =
R 1
γ ˜ Lfdi =
(1−γ)˜ L. Furthermore each of these individual labor supplies is represented by one
union j,w h e r ew eh a v eKH (KF)u n i o n si nH (F). Thus one can write aggregate












LIML ≡ γ +( 1− γ)[(j − 1)/KF] and LIMH ≡ γ +( 1− γ)[j/KF]). Using the
(linear) production functions and the fact that in equilibrium each ﬁrm will employ
an identical number of workers, i.e. Lh
i = Lh = ˜ Lh(1−uH) and L
f
i = Lf = ˜ Lf(1−uF)









1−γ . Using the
approximation that ln(1−uH) ≈− uH and ln(1−uF) ≈− uF we can ﬁnally derive:
TOT ≡ pF − pH = uF − uH, which is equation (33) in the text.















where D ≡ γλHZF +(1−γ)λFZH+λHλF > 0.S i n c ea l lt h eλ’s and Z’s are positive
(cf. (37)) and
∂λH
∂αH = −γσH < 0 and
∂λF
∂αF = −(1 − γ)σF < 0 the result follows.
31Note the formulas for pH and p∗


















∂αF > 0 and
∂uF






















0 which proofs the second part of the proposition.
Proposition 3:















∂σH = −γ<0 and
∂λH
∂σH = −θ +1− γαH ≷ 0 for 1 − γαH ≷ θ.S ot h et o t a l
eﬀect on unemployment is not clear. In fact even in the case where we limit the
range of αH to 0 ≤ αH ≤ 1 we get an inconclusive result. In this case
∂λH
∂σH < 0 (since
θ>1) but the sign of the nominator is still not clear, since λH
∂ZH
∂σH is negative and
−ZH
∂λH
∂σH is positive. We can calculate, however, that
∂uH
∂σH < 0 for P1 ≡
1−αHγ
θ(1−γ) > 1,
as stated in the proposition, where ∂P1
∂γ > 0, ∂P1
∂θ < 0, ∂P1
∂αH < 0. Parallel reasoning












D2 . Note that the size of country F
increases in (1 − γ).
Proposition 4:









































have already appeared in the







































∂σF for P2 ≶ 1.
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